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Cake day: July 7th, 2024

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  • Schrodinger makes a good argument in the book “Nature and the Greek and Science and Humanism” that we should actually just abandon the idea that there even is a trajectory.

    Our sciences are derived from inductive reasoning. You drop a ball, it falls to the ground, you repeat it, it falls again, and eventually, you come up with a mathematical law to describe this. You assume from that point if you drop it an infinite number of times, it will always fall to the ground, but this is just an assumption that cannot be proven.

    When the members of the Frontiers of Science discussed physics, they often used the abbreviation “SF.” They didn’t mean “science fiction,” but the two words “shooter” and “farmer.” This was a reference to two hypotheses, both involving the fundamental nature of the laws of the universe. In the shooter hypothesis, a good marksman shoots at a target, creating a hole every ten centimeters. Now suppose the surface of the target is inhabited by intelligent, two-dimensional creatures. Their scientists, after observing the universe, discover a great law: “There exists a hole in the universe every ten centimeters.” They have mistaken the result of the marksman’s momentary whim for an unalterable law of the universe. The farmer hypothesis, on the other hand, has the flavor of a horror story: Every morning on a turkey farm, the farmer comes to feed the turkeys. A scientist turkey, having observed this pattern to hold without change for almost a year, makes the following discovery: “Every morning at eleven, food arrives.” On the morning of Thanksgiving, the scientist announces this law to the other turkeys. But that morning at eleven, food doesn’t arrive; instead, the farmer comes and kills the entire flock.

    — Cixin Liu

    We also do this to derive our concept of trajectories. We can measure something a x(0) and x(t), then repeat the experiment and measure it at x(0.5t), then repeat it again and measure it at x(0.25t) and x(0.75t), so on and so forth, measuring many many in-between points. From that, we assume that if we continue to cut the intervals in half and measuring in between, our predictions will continue to hold, making us conclude that there is a completely continuous transition between x(0) and x(t) exactly as described by our mathematics, which we can fit to unambiguous mathematical equations.

    Yet, this is just an assumption. We cannot actually know that this continuous transition exists, and what Schrodinger argued is that there is in fact good reason to think it doesn’t. This is because, in various particle experiments, you cannot actually try to reconstruct this path in a way that is unambiguous and would be consistent with every experiment. It is much simpler just to treat it as if the particle was over there at x(0), and now it is over here at x(t), with a time delay of t. Rovelli describes it as nature evolving through succession of events, rather than nature being made up of “stones bouncing around,” nature flows according to these succession of events whereby things manifest their properties to one another during an interaction, but there is no trajectory the particle actually took in between interactions.

    These trajectories are entirely metaphysical and could never actually be experimentally verified, since verification requires observation, and observation is an interaction, so to posit that there is any path in between interactions is to posit that there exists something in between observations, and by definition you could not observe that. It would always have to be something assumed a priori. This is what I meant when I said most people approach quantum mechanical interpretation seem to have a desire to assume quantum theory can tell us about things beyond what is even possible to observe, and much of the confusion around the theory is trying to philosophically understand this unobservable realm of what is going on in between observations.

    I tend to agree with physicists like Schrodinger, Rovelli, and Francois Igor Pris that what makes the most sense is to just abandon this because it is entirely metaphysical and ultimately faith-based and cannot actually be experimentally verified. We should just stick to what we can actually confirm through observational evidence, and observations are discrete, so any continuity we assume about nature is ultimately metaphysical and could not be derived from observation. That is why it makes more sense to consider reality not as autonomous stones bouncing around, but as a succession of discrete events, and the physical sciences allows us to predict what properties of systems will be realized during those events.



  • I’ve adopted a few views that helped me cope with the practically non-existent explanation of what is really going on:

    The thing is, I’ve been obsessed with this topic for so long that I do not really agree. The purpose of me being interested in the topic is to research and find reasonable explanations, and there is only so many years you can do that before you actually start coming to some conclusions.

    These days I am a strong supporter of the contextual realist approach, which the philosopher-physicist Francois Igor Pris has some good books on the subject, but sadly he does not write in English if you only speak English, but mostly in Russian. It is based on the writings of the philosopher Jocelyn Benoist, which you can read his book Towards a Contextual Realism which has a good English translation, it is more philosophy than physics, although it does touch a little bit on quantum mechanics towards the end. Pris’s books are more specifically about the application of Benoist’s philosophical framework to quantum theory.

    Our brains are meat computers. Theories talk about the following: What does a computer measure after they have performed an experiment? In other words, theory isn’t supposed to be emotionally fulfilling. It is merely making predictions for the computer.

    I see the purpose of theories as ultimately to be able to predict how things change. If I drop a ball, it falls to the ground, if I drop it again, it falls again, and so I can assume through inductive reasoning that if I drop a third time, it will probably fall again. I could then create a mathematical model which describes this behavior, and so anyone can plug into the model the ball when lifted up, and then run a computation and see what it spits out is a prediction of the ball having fallen to the ground.

    I am by no means a utilitarian when it comes to scientific theories, as if I think they are just “useful tools for making predictions and tell us nothing about reality.” Rather, my view is that these “useful tools for making predictions” are useful precisely because they tell us something about reality: they capture how reality changes over time. If they did not, they could not be used to make predictions about it.

    I think a lot of the difficulty in interpreting quantum theory is that a lot of people see ontology somewhat differently. They think that the ontology is not merely how reality that we can experimentally observe changes over time, but that it must also tell us about some alternative realm beyond all possibilities to ever observe. People for some reason have a desire to introduce additional and unnecessary metaphysics to the ontology of the system, to add things to it we cannot actually ever verify is actually there, and it’s my view that if you abandon this temptation then you avoid much of the conceptual difficulties of the theory.

    Truth is a lot like the stars. There’s one big one, and a lot of small ones. Maybe we just have to accept that quantum physics is all about the many small ones.

    To be honest, I’m not sure what you mean by this.


  • bunchberry@lemmy.worldto196@lemmy.blahaj.zonethey were buddies rule
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    2 months ago

    That’s not how political parties work, though. Political parties are largely ideological institutions, they exist first and foremost not to win elections but to propagate an ideology, and winning the election is just a sign that they succeeded in their goal of convincing people of their ideology, and so now enough people agree that it can take root in the state. When political parties lose, it’s very rare that they will interpret their loss as “we need to abandon all our values to match the opinion polls.” No, they interpret their loss as meaning they failed in their goal of convincing people of their values, and thus should change their strategy of their out-reach, not changing their whole ideological position.

    Democrats going against the rich elites would be an abandonment of their party’s values and everything they stand for. In most countries, if you dislike the ideology of a party, you vote for someone else. The party itself has no obligation to change its entire ideology for you, such a thing very rarely occurs. If that was the case, then every political party would all have the exact same position, just all copy/pastes of whatever the opinion polls say.

    I keep seeing all this bizarre rhetoric about how if the Democrats were “smart” they would just abandon their whole party’s platform and adopt some other platform, but this makes zero sense, because you have to consider motivation. Their motivation is not to just win the election, but to convince you of their ideology, and abandoning their ideology does not achieve this. Democrats are not stupid, they just don’t have the same motivations as you. Yes, they want to win, but they ultimately want to win on their platform, not on someone else’s platform.

    That’s how political parties work. They have a platform, and the platform is paramount. If a green party adopted all pro-coal and pro-oil lobby positions just to win an election, that would not be a “smart” decision for them, because, even if it leads to their victory, it still is an abandonment of their ideology. Democrats are unabashedly a pro-rich elite party, it should not be smart for them to become anti-elite, because it is not aligned with their motivations.


  • bunchberry@lemmy.worldto196@lemmy.blahaj.zoneRule medication
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    2 months ago

    Yes, it’s ultimately a cautionary tale as to why social democracy is unsustainable, as it is just the implementation of social policies while maintaining capitalist hegemony. There is no such thing as a benevolent oligarch. Capitalists have utilitarian reasons to implement pro-worker social policies, and it’s usually to reduce unrest or increase productivity. The moment those reasons no longer become relevant, they will begin to dismantle it. Much of western Europe in general right now is suffering from nonstop austerity for a long time now.


  • I have a degree in computer science, and have always loved learning about computing. Whenever there is some new kind of computer on the market, I try to get ahold of it to learn to start programming for it entirely on my own free time as a hobby. When I got into quantum computing, I got rather frustrated at most explanations on the subject regarding how it worked. I mean, the mathematics isn’t even that bad, just a lot of linear algebra. It was the language around the mathematics that bothered me, nobody could give me a consistent description of what was really going on, that is to say, there was no consistent account of the relationship between the mathematics and the ontology of the theory. Really, the theory has no ontology, as the Copenhagen interpretation largely stresses that quantum mechanics represents the limits of human knowledge, so we cannot actually say anything about how nature really is. At that point, I kind of become obsessed over the topic of the relationship between the mathematics and ontology, reading tons and tons of books on the subject, going all the way back to Heisenberg, Einstein, Schrodinger, Bohr, to reading many contemporary authors. It’s really natural philosophy that interests me, I have never put much thought into things like moral philosophy or other kinds.


  • Sorry, but this video is just painful to listen to, as it is just a series of claims where none of them are explained in any detail what is actually meant.

    • “We’ve moved now into fully materialist thinking where everything is dead there is no Divine Beyond, and so Consciousness is the problem that needs to be solved. But the problem with that is there’s nothing in well that is the problem is that there’s nothing in matter that would make you think that it could be conscious”
    • “…at one point that, even though everything in an organism is completely dependent on seemingly not living or non-conscious physical processes, he says that it could be that all these physical processes physics itself is there for life so that’s almost theological or at least somewhat mystical and that still separates life from matter in a certain way.”
    • " I wonder if conscious experience is actually to be found in the wave function or whatever the wave function represents for us because there’s no way for a thought to be just like a collection of electrons and and protons constructed together like Lego blocks."
    • “I’m not convinced that any software can be conscious on the kind of computing hardware that we have, and I think if we want to make sentient robots we’re going to need a different kind of hardware, and it could be…smart materials”

    All of these kinds of phrases are just presented without much elaboration. If you are going to do a whole video, you might as well actually elaborate on what you’re talking about. The whole video is largely just presenting a series of conclusions without putting much effort to explaining.

    The closest thing the guy in the video gets to explaining anything is trying to justify it through “smart materials,” but his own explanation contradicts himself as he does not define these “smart materials” in terms of a new chemical structure or a new atomic number, but instead describes them in terms of their behavior, stating that they are “materials that participate in their own generation…to be able to construct themselves.”

    However, if you’re defining “smart materials” purely in terms of their function, their ability to construct themselves, then there is no reason in principle that machines made of iron and silicon could not construct themselves, albeit engineering self-reproducing robots is hard, but no reason to think it would literally require a new substance to achieve.

    He never even explains anything about what is meant by “consciousness” so I have no idea what he is getting at with any of those other phrases, but he suggests in one of those quotes that this “consciousness” could be achieved with “smart materials,” and thus he seems to define consciousness in terms of a behavior which I see no reason we could not replicate in principle, contradicting again the previous statements that this is somehow a big challenge for “materialists.”


  • Agreed, I second the point that discontinuous time is no way in contradiction to belief in the present. Whatever step you are in that discontinuity would be the present. To suggest that it moving in discrete steps implies the present is the past, I’m not sure what that even means, I am wondering if Jaumel is imagining a continuous time that is constantly moving and then comparing that to the discrete time. The continuous time would always be ahead of it. But, of course, that thought experiment implies there is a continuous time, which contradicts with the notion that time is discrete, and so such a thought experiment would not be valid. If time is discontinuous, it would only move in discrete steps, so whatever is the current step would be the present.


  • I am a direct realist so by necessity I am a presentist, as you can only observe the present. The past exists only in terms of presently-existing records, such as the fossil record. When we talk about the past existing, what we are really talking about is models we constructed in the present based on empirical data in the present. Saying Socrates is taller than Descartes is like saying the Giant Man is taller than Jack. The statement makes sense when we keep in mind the context in which the statement is being made. The context of the latter statement is being made in reference to the fictional texts of Jack and the Beanstalk. The context of the former statement is being made in reference to historical records of Socrates and Descartes. These texts/records exist in the present so it is sensible to make those kinds of statements about them when that context is kept in mind.


  • bunchberry@lemmy.worldto196@lemmy.blahaj.zoneCaptcha rule
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    2 months ago

    Bell’s theorem demonstrates that you cannot have a deterministic theory that would also be Lorentz invariant, that is to say, compatible with special relativity and the speed of light limit. The speed of light limit is very well tested over and over again, and no one to this day has ever been able to construct even a single mathematical model that could even approximately reconstruct the predictions of quantum field theory in a way that is deterministic. That suggests that any deterministic theory would actually make quantifiably different predictions than quantum field theory, and yet we don’t have any evidence that its predictions are violated, and quantum field theory is verified to 12 decimal places of precision.

    I don’t really understand your point about the dice. If you have two “quantum” dice that are exactly the same, they are not guaranteed to land on the same thing, and that is precisely what it means to be nondeterministic, that even if all the initial conditions are the same, the outcome can be different. Yes, we cannot make the whole universe the same throughout the experiment, but to make sense of this, you cannot speak in vague philosophy but need to actually specify in mathematical terms what parts of the universe you think are determining the outcome, which, again, any attempt to specify such a thing would require contradicting the predictions of quantum field theory.

    My issue with your argument is that, whether or not you intended this or not, what you are undeniably arguing is that all our current physical theories are currently wrong and making the wrong predictions, and they need to be adjusted to make the right predictions, and you are basing this off of what is ultimately a philosophical criticism, i.e. that it is not deterministic and you think it should be, without even having a viable model of what this determinism would look like. It just seems far too speculative to me.

    Yes, you can always make the argument that “our old theories have been proven wrong before, like Newton’s gravity was replaced with Einstein’s gravity, so we shouldn’t put much stock into our current theories,” but I just find this unconvincing, as you can make this argument in literally any era, and thus it completely negates the possibility of using science to understand the properties of nature. Every scientific theory would have to always be interpreted as just something tentative that can’t tell us anything about nature, because it’s bound to be replaced later, and instead we’re just left arguing vague philosophy not based on anything empirical.

    I will readily admit that if I base my understanding of reality on our best physical sciences of the era, those can be overturned and I could be shown to be wrong. However, I still find it to be the most reasonable position as opposed to trying to “intuit” our way to an understanding of nature. The person who strongly defended the Newtonian picture of nature prior to Einstein was later shown to be wrong, yes, but he was still far more correct than the majority of those who insisted upon trying to derive an understanding of nature entirely from intuition/philosophy. I am with Heisenberg who argued that until we actually have any experimental evidence that violates the predictions of quantum field theory and can only be corrected with the introduction of hidden variables, then positing their existence is pointless metaphysical speculation, not derived from anything empirical.


  • It is only continuous because it is random, so prior to making a measurement, you describe it in terms of a probability distribution called the state vector. The bits 0 and 1 are discrete, but if I said it was random and asked you to describe it, you would assign it a probability between 0 and 1, and thus it suddenly becomes continuous. (Although, in quantum mechanics, probability amplitudes are complex-valued.) The continuous nature of it is really something epistemic and not ontological. We only observe qubits as either 0 or 1, with discrete values, never anything in between the two.


  • Classical computers compute using 0s and 1s which refer to something physical like voltage levels of 0v or 3.3v respectively. Quantum computers also compute using 0s and 1s that also refers to something physical, like the spin of an electron which can only be up or down. Although these qubits differ because with a classical bit, there is just one thing to “look at” (called “observables”) if you want to know its value. If I want to know the voltage level is 0 or 1 I can just take out my multimeter and check. There is just one single observable.

    With a qubit, there are actually three observables: σx, σy, and σz. You can think of a qubit like a sphere where you can measure it along its x, y, or z axis. These often correspond in real life to real rotations, for example, you can measure electron spin using something called Stern-Gerlach apparatus and you can measure a different axis by physically rotating the whole apparatus.

    How can a single 0 or 1 be associated with three different observables? Well, the qubit can only have a single 0 or 1 at a time, so, let’s say, you measure its value on the z-axis, so you measure σz, and you get 0 or 1, then the qubit ceases to have values for σx or σy. They just don’t exist anymore. If you then go measure, let’s say, σx, then you will get something entirely random, and then the value for σz will cease to exist. So it can only hold one bit of information at a time, but measuring it on a different axis will “interfere” with that information.

    It’s thus not possible to actually know the values for all the different observables because only one exists at a time, but you can also use them in logic gates where one depends on an axis with no value. For example, if you measure a qubit on the σz axis, you can then pass it through a logic gate where it will flip a second qubit or not flip it because on whether or not σx is 0 or 1. Of course, if you measured σz, then σx has no value, so you can’t say whether or not it will flip the other qubit, but you can say that they would be correlated with one another (if σx is 0 then it will not flip it, if it is 1 then it will, and thus they are related to one another). This is basically what entanglement is.

    Because you cannot know the outcome when you have certain interactions like this, you can only model the system probabilistically based on the information you do know, and because measuring qubits on one axis erases its value on all others, then some information you know about the system can interfere with (cancel out) other information you know about it. Waves also can interfere with each other, and so oddly enough, it turns out you can model how your predictions of the system evolve over the computation using a wave function which then can be used to derive a probability distribution of the results.

    What is even more interesting is that if you have a system like this where you have to model it using a wave function, it turns out it can in principle execute certain algorithms exponentially faster than classical computers. So they are definitely nowhere near the same as classical computers. Their complexity scales up exponentially when trying to simulate quantum computers on a classical computer. Every additional qubit doubles the complexity, and thus it becomes really difficult to even simulate small numbers of qubits. I built my own simulator in C and it uses 45 gigabytes of RAM to simulate just 16. I think the world record is literally only like 56.



  • Even if you believe there really exists a “hard problem of consciousness,” even Chalmers admits such a thing would have to be fundamentally unobservable and indistinguishable from something that does not have it (see his p-zombie argument), so it could never be something discovered by the sciences, or something discovered at all. Believing there is something immaterial about consciousness inherently requires an a priori assumption and cannot be something derived from a posteriori observational evidence.


  • bunchberry@lemmy.worldto196@lemmy.blahaj.zoneRule elitism
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    7 months ago

    We feel conscious and have an internal experience

    It does not make sense to add the qualifier “internal” unless it is being contrasted with “external.” It makes no sense to say “I’m inside this house” unless you’re contrasting it with “as opposed to outside the house.” Speaking of “internal experience” is a bit odd in my view because it implies there is such thing as an “external experience”. What would that even be?

    What about the p-zombie, the human person who just doesn’t have an internal experience and just had a set of rules, but acts like every other human?

    The p-zombie argument doesn’t make sense as you can only conceive of things that are remixes of what you’ve seen before. I have never seen a pink elephant but I’ve seen pink things and I’ve seen elephants so I can remix them in my mind and imagine it. But if you ask me to imagine an elephant a color I’ve never seen before? I just can’t do it, I wouldn’t even know what that means. Indeed, a person blind since birth cannot “see” at all, not in their imagination, not even in their dreams.

    The p-zombie argument asks us to conceive of two people that are not observably different in every way yet still different because one is lacking some property that the other has. But if you’re claiming you can conceive of this, I just don’t believe you. You’re probably playing some mental tricks on yourself to make you think you can conceive of it but you cannot. If there is nothing observably different about them then there is nothing conceivably different about them either.

    What about a cat, who apparently has a less complex internal experience, but seems to act like we’d expect if it has something like that? What about a tick, or a louse? What about a water bear? A tree? A paramecium? A bacteria? A computer program?

    This is what Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers ask and then settles on “mammals only” because they have an unjustified mammalian bias. Like I said, there is no “internal” experience, there is just experience. Nagel and Chalmers both rely on an unjustified premise that “point-of-view” is unique to mammalian brains because supposedly objective reality is point-of-view independent and since experience clearly has an aspect of point-of-view then that means experience too must be a product purely of mammalian brains, and then demands the “physicalists” prove how non-experiential reality gives rise to the experiential realm.

    But the entire premise is arbitrary and wrong. Objective reality is not point-of-view independent. In general relativity, reality literally change depending on your point-of-view. Time passes a bit faster for people standing up than people sitting down, lengths of rulers can change between observers, velocity of objects can change as well. Relational quantum mechanics goes even further and shows that all variable properties of particles depend upon point-of-view.

    The idea that objective reality is point-of-view independent is just entirely false. It is point-of-view dependent all the way down. Experience is just objective reality as it actually exists independent of the observer but dependent upon the point-of-view in which they occupy. It has nothing to do with mammalian brains, “consciousness,” or subjectivity. If reality is point-of-view dependent all the way down, then it is not even possible to conceive of an intelligent being that would occupy a unique point-of-view, because everything occupies their own unique point-of-view, even a rock. It’s not a byproduct of the “conscious mind” but just a property of objective reality: experience is objective reality independent of the observer, but dependent upon the context of that experience.

    There’s a continuum one could construct that includes all those things and ranks them by how similar their behaviors are to ours, and calls the things close to us conscious and the things farther away not, but the line is ever going to be fuzzy. There’s no categorical difference that separates one end of the spectrum from the other, it’s just about picking where to put the line.

    When you go down this continuum what gradually disappears is cognition, that is to say, the ability to think about, reflect upon, be self-aware of, one’s point-of-view. The point-of-viewness of reality, or more simply the contextual nature of reality, does not disappear at any point. Only the ability to talk about it disappears. A rock cannot tell you anything about what it’s like to be a rock from its context, it has no ability to reflect upon the point-of-view it occupies.

    Although you’re right there is no hard-and-fast line for cognition, but that’s true of anything in nature. There’s no hard-and-fast line for anything. Take a cat for example, where does the cat begin and end, both in space in time? Create a rigorous definition of its borders. You won’t be able to do it. All our conceptions are human creations and therefore a bit fuzzy. Reality is infinitely complex and we cannot deal with the infinite complexity all at once so we break it up into chunks that are easier to work with: cats, dogs, trees, red, blue, hydrogen, helium, etc. But you always find when you look at these things a little more closely that their nature as discrete “things” becomes rather fuzzy and disappears.


  • bunchberry@lemmy.worldto196@lemmy.blahaj.zonedamn…
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    7 months ago

    You shouldn’t take it that seriously. MWI has a lot of zealots in the popular media who act like it’s a proven fact, kind of like some String Theorists do, but it is actually rather dubious.

    MWI claims it is simpler because they are getting rid of the Born rule, so it has less assumptions, but the reason there is the Born rule in QM is because… well, it’s needed to actually predict the right results. You can’t just throw it out. It’s also impossible to derive the Born rule without some sort of additional assumption, and there is no agreed upon way to do this.[1]

    This makes MWI actually more complicated than traditional quantum mechanics because they have to add different arbitrary assumptions and then add an additional layer of mathematics to derive the Born rule from it, rather than assuming it. These derivations also tend to be incredibly arbitrary because the assumptions you have to make to derive it are always chosen specifically for the purpose of deriving the Born rule and don’t seem to make much sense otherwise, and thus are just as arbitrary as assuming the Born rule directly.[2] [3]

    If you prefer a video, the one below discusses various “multiverse” ideas including MWI and also discusses how it ultimately ends up being more mathematically complicated than other interpretations of QM.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QHa1vbwVaNU

    MWI also makes no sense for a separate reason. If you consider the electromagnetic field for example, how do we know it exists? We know it exists because we can see its effect on particles. If you drop some iron filings around a magnet, it conforms to the shape of a field, but ultimately what you are seeing is the iron filings and not the field itself, but the effects of the field. Now, imagine if someone claimed the iron filings don’t even exist, only the field. You’d be a bit confused because, well, you only know the field exists because of its effects on the filings. You can’t see the field, only the particles, so if you deny the particles, then you’re just left in confusion.

    This is effectively what MWI does. We live in a world composed of spacetime containing particles, yet wave functions describe, well, waves made of nothing that exist in an abstract space known as Hilbert space. Schrodinger’s derivation of his famous wave equation is based on observing the behavior of particles. MWI denies particles even exist and everything is just waves in Hilbert space made of nothing, which is very bizarre because then you would be effectively claiming the entire universe is composed of something entirely invisible. So how does that explain everything we see?

    [I]t does not account, per se, for the phenomenological reality that we actually observe. In order to describe the phenomena that we observe, other mathematical elements are needed besides ψ: the individual variables, like X and P, that we use to describe the world. The Many Worlds interpretation does not explain them clearly. It is not enough to know the ψ wave and Schrödinger’s equation in order to define and use quantum theory: we need to specify an algebra of observables, otherwise we cannot calculate anything and there is no relation with the phenomena of our experience. The role of this algebra of observables, which is extremely clear in other interpretations, is not at all clear in the Many Worlds interpretation.

    --- Carlo Rovelli, Helgoland: Making Sense of the Quantum Revolution

    The philosopher Tim Maudlin has a whole lecture you can watch below on this problem, pointing out how MWI makes no sense because nothing in the interpretation includes anything we can actually observe. It quite literally describes a whole universe without observables.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=us7gbWWPUsA

    Not to rain on your parade or anything if you are just having fun, but there is a lot of misinformation on websites like YouTube painting MWI as more reasonable than it actually is, so I just want people to be aware.